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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
EXPROPRIATION
Melvin G. Dakin*
A number of important changes in expropriation law and
procedure were made during the past year, including adop-
tion of a new state constitution restoring a limited jury trial
in expropriation cases.1 For more than three decades all ex-
propriation issues in Louisiana have been tried to a judge
sitting without a jury,2 but as a result of the constitutional
change any party may demand a trial by jury to determine
just compensation. 3 Since the symposium is generally limited
to jurisprudential developments during the past term of
court, these legislative changes will not be further detailed
here.
VALUATION OF PROPERTY TAKEN
For some years there have been conflicting decisions as to
the elements of value includible when the highest and best
use of land taken is for subdivision purposes but the land is
not yet subdivided. State v. Terrace Land Co.4 holds that if the
sale of lots for subdivision purposes is reasonably prospective
and the evidence shows the owner-developer is actually in the
process of developing and selling land as subdivision lots, the
award may properly include the element of profit estimated to
be realized by the owner-developer, presumably discounted
back to the date of taking. The court is careful to note, how-
ever, that raw acreage value rather than retail lot value may
still be appropriate when subdivision of the land is only spec-
ulative at the time of the taking.5
The valuation rules applicable when part of a larger tract
is taken for the purpose of widening a highway continues to
command the attention of the Louisiana courts. If the tract
has greater depth than necessary for ideal commercial de-
velopment, courts apply the "front land-rear land" theory as
opposed to an "average value" approach. The theory results
in higher awards for front land taken despite the fact that the
remaining land then becomes front land on the widened
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. LA. CONST. art. 1, § 4.
2. LA. R.S. 19:4 (1950), as amended by La. Acts 1974, Ex. Sess. No. 11, § 1.
3. LA. R.S. 48:451.1-.23 (Supp. 1974).
4. 298 So. 2d 859 (La. 1974).
5. See State v. Rapier, 246 La. 150, 164 So. 2d 280 (1964).
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highway. State v. Hab Monsur Corp.8 again approves this
approach. If the tract taken is less than ideal commercial
depth, a court of appeal has held that an average value per
square foot must be determined for the commercial property
in ideal depth and the tract expropriated must be valued on
the basis of the average.7 Owners have contended that even
within this ideal depth the front portion of the property
should be valued at a higher figure than the rear portion.
State v. Guaranty Realty Corp. 8 and State v. Wells9 reject this
contention, holding that gradations within the ideal depth are
not warranted and that values must be determined upon the
average value per square foot to the ideal depth estimated by
the appraisers.
In State v. Smith,10 another case involving a highway
taking, the court of appeal noted that when only a portion of a
tract is taken and there is a definite difference in use poten-
tial between the front and rear portion, application of a
graduated valuation criteria may be warranted. If the entire
tract is being used for the same purpose and is presumably
proportioned depth-wise for that purpose, the average rather
than graduated value is more appropriate; the court rejected
the graduated criteria, finding the tract to have only one
use."
If additional property is taken after the public improve-
ment is begun or completed the issue arises whether the
changed circumstances should lead to a higher judgment for
compensation reflecting value added by the improvement. In
general the law is clear that the value of the property expro-
priated should be fixed considering the property at the time of
the taking but not enhanced by the purpose of the taking.12
However, when subsequently expropriated property is not
included within the scope of the project at the outset and the
project is thereafter enlarged to include the additional prop-
erty, or if subsequent expropriation is for a separate en-
deavor, the enhanced value attributable to proximity to the
6. 301 So. 2d 667 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1974).
7. State v. Evans, 305 So. 2d 151 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1974).
8. 295 So. 2d 490 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1974).
9. 298 So. 2d 301 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1974).
10. 304 So. 2d 77 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1974). See also State v. Evans, 305 So.
2d 151, 154 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1974).
11. State v. Smith, 304 So. 2d 77, 81 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1974).
12. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2633.
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initial improvement is properly included in the award. 13 In
State v. Wax 14 the subsequent expropriation was clearly for a
separate endeavor and consequently enhanced value at-
tributable to the initial public improvement was properly
awarded. In a similar case, State v. St. Tammany Homestead
Ass'n,15 the court of appeal considered a further refinement of
the rule to the effect that "if it is reasonably foreseeable that
the original project will probably extend, or will probably be
revised, enlarged or expanded to include the property sub-
sequently taken, landowners are not entitled to the enhanced
value resulting from the initial expropriation.' 6 The court
then concluded that the extension or enlargement of the
project was not "reasonably foreseeable" and enhanced value
was here also properly awarded. 17
One strength of Louisiana's system of judicially-
determined expropriation awards has been the judges' exer-
cise of control over unrealistic or distorted application of ap-
praisal theory in seeking a maximum value for property ex-
propriated. State v. Anselmo' 8 illustrates the virtues of that
procedure. The owner, in seeking maximum value for a build-
ing taken, determined a total value on a replacement cost
basis but sought to reduce the replacement costs by deprecia-
tion on the original cost of the building rather than on the
greater replacement cost. The court properly rejected the
approach and also rejected as unhelpful an attempt to use
capitalization of income as a basis. The owner had capitalized
rental income by compounding lease rentals for a sixty-five
year term, resulting in a figure 490% of its present value on
the basis of market determination by comparable sales. 19 The
court also refused to augment severance damages by sub-
stituting actual income studies for a six-year period sub-
sequent to the taking for actual comparable sales in the area
immediately after the taking.
13. M. DAKIN & M. KLEIN, EMINENT DOMAIN IN LOUISIANA 93-95 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as DAKIN & KLEIN].
14. 295 So. 2d 833 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1974).
15. 304 So. 2d 765 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1974).
16. Id. at 769.
17. Id. at 770.
18. 301 So. 2d 915 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974).
19. Id. at 920.
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SEVERANCE DAMAGES
In measuring severance damages Louisiana courts use
the so-called "before and after rule" entailing the valuation of
the property before and after the taking, the difference be-
tween the fair market values constituting severance dam-
ages. 20 Replacement value less depreciation may properly be
used to measure the value of improvements provided the land
and improvements are actually in use at the time of the
taking.21 In State v. Wood Preserving Service, Inc.22 a court of
appeal rejected the use of replacement value and reduced the
severance damage award since the plant in question had not
been used for at least eight years prior to the taking and it
was not shown that the property satisfied any of the normal
appraisal requirements for implying the "value in use" con-
cept. The appellate court was free to substitute its judgment
as to the appropriate "expert" approach in view of the fact
that an inappropriate application of an appraisal rule would
constitute error of law subject to correction by the appellate
court.
2 3
In State v. Jacobsen,24 a court of appeal approved the use
of replacement cost for the calculation of severance damages
but corrected the trial court's failure to deduct depreciation
from replacement costs new. The court also noted that since a
building on the remaining tract would have to be demolished,
the costs of demolition, rather than the replacement cost,
were properly a part of severance damages. The court ap-
proved special benefits as a reduction in severance damages
awarded, noting, however, that .the burden of proving special
benefits was upon the expropriator whether on a percentage
basis or an actual dollar basis; special benefits were proven to
the extent of five percent of the "before" value. 25
In State v. Denham Springs Development Co. 26 the
Louisiana Supreme Court reinstated a trial court judgment
allowing severance damages for the taking of property from
20. DAKIN & KLEIN at 75.
21. Id. at 247; W. KINARD, INDUSTRIAL REAL ESTATE 418 (2d ed. 1970).
22. 302 So. 2d 655 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1974).
23. DAKIN & KLEIN at 340; Comment, Appellate Review of Facts in
Louisiana Civil Cases, 21 LA. L. REV. 402, 414 (1961).
24. 306 So. 2d 886 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974).
25. Id. at 892-93.
26. 307 So. 2d 304 (La. 1975).
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an existing shopping center. The court found damages proven
since existing practice demonstrated a need for a ratio of
parking space to service space of three to one and since, after
the taking, the potential building area was commensurately
reduced. The court calculated severance damages based on
what the original tract would have commanded in shopping
center rentals versus what it would command in its reduced
square footage. Dissenters would have rejected such evidence
as "entirely speculative. '27
The Louisiana Supreme Court has expressed disapproval
of "cost to cure" as a primary approach to measuring sever-
ance damages but it has used the method when other
methods such as market data are unavailable or impractica-
ble to measure "before and after" value. 28 In State v. Nisbet
Properties, Inc.2 9 a court of appeal concluded that severance
damages to a parking lot could be properly calculated by
determining the cost to replace the parking spaces taken.
Although an obvious deficiency in the method is that the
costs proposed may cure more than the actual damages
caused by the taking, the court approved its use, having ad-
justed costs to reflect only actual damages.30 On the other
hand, in State v. A-1 Equipment Rentals, Inc.,31 the court
rejected the method when the record was completely devoid
of any evidence that the cure urged by the state could in fact
be effective.
In City of New Iberia v. Yeutter 32 the landowner made the
rather disingenuous argument that he was entitled not only
to the fair market value of the property as determined by
comparable sales but also was entitled to the full undis-
counted amount of rentals anticipated from the entire prop-
erty under a forty month lease subject to renewal for an
additional sixty months; the duplicative claim was rejected by
the court.3 3 The owner contended that the lease rentals con-
stituted a vested right analogous to the right for which com-
pensation was awarded in Parish of Jefferson v. Miron.34 In
Miron, a disabled owner was compensated for his equity in
27. Id at 308.
28. Rtiymond v. State, 255 La. 425, 451-52, 231 So. 2d 375, 384-85 (1970).
29. 309 So. 2d 398 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1975).
30. Id. at 402.
31. 310 So. 2d 673 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1975).
32. 307 So. 2d 393 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1975).
33. Id. at 395. See DAKIN & KLEIN at 266-69.
34. 288 So. 2d 65 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974).
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the property and the mortgage holder was compensated for
the unpaid mortgage indebtedness. In addition, the court
awarded the discounted value of future disability payments
payable to the owner by the mortgage insurer. The disability
payments were to apply on the indebtedness as made but
would terminate if the mortgage was prepaid. However, since
the expropriation triggered an involuntary prepayment of the
mortgage and thus terminated the disability payments, the
court reasoned that the expropriation deprived the owner of a
vested right to collect disability payments for a maximum
period of sixty months; 35 no duplication of payment occurred
since the expropriation clearly deprived the owner of the pos-
sibility of reducing the mortgage indebtedness over the re-
maining period and thus enhancing his equity in the prop-
erty.3 6 In Yeutter, on the other hand, a demand for the undis-
counted value of the rentals from the entire property in addi-
tion to the full fair present market value of the entire prop-
erty would be to demand the value of the property unencum-
bered by the lease, which would be its entire value, and the
value of the lease which necessarily would reduce the unen-
cumbered value; the lease would have its own independent
value, not, however, the undiscounted total rentals, but the
present discounted value of the expected future rentals.37
A court of appeal has again held that esthetic considera-
tions may reduce the market value of property adjacent to a
transmission line servitude. In Southwest Louisiana Electric
Membership Corp. v. Beck 38 the court accepted opinion evi-
dence that adjacent property would suffer a thirty percent
diminution in value as a result of proximity to a transmission
line. In Southwest Louisiana Electric Membership Corp. v.
Duhon39 the same court accepted opinion evidence that a
decrease of fifty percent in value was suffered by land adja-
cent to a transmission line. The court held that unsightliness
coupled with public market resistance to the property adjoin-
ing servitudes supporting such utilities characterized by
danger, "whether real or presumed," resulted in a loss in
market value. In State v. Clement,40 in which a taking for
35. Id. at 67.
36. Id.
37. DAKIN & KLEIN at 266-69.
38. 299 So. 2d 411 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1974).
39. 313 So. 2d 366 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1975).
40. 311 So. 2d 5 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1975).
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interstate highway purposes resulted in reducing the dis-
tance of a rural residence from the highway by some 250 feet
to some 12 feet at the nearest point, the court accepted opin-
ion evidence that the damage to the residence, resulting from
traffic noise, impairment of view and loss of privacy, had
impaired value to the extent of some eighty percent. The
court corrected a trial court determination of severance dam-
age to the land itself for failure to exclude from a "before and
after" calculation the value already compensated for by
virtue of a previously transferred servitude on the same
property. 4 1
As a general rule, if no property is taken courts will not
allow compensation for damage caused by traffic regulation,
since this is usually termed an exercise of the police power.42
In the exceptional case when damage resulting from traffic
regulation is compensable, the damage must be special or
peculiar to the particular property rather than common to all
other property owners in proximity.43 In State v. Capone44 the
court found no special or peculiar damages when a parking
area, previously available on an unused portion of a dedicated
street in front of commercial premises, was utilized for
another lane of traffic; a trial court award of "cost of cure"
damages, consisting of the cost to set back the building
sufficiently to provide new parking spaces, was reversed. 45
PROCEDURE
Several years ago Louisiana adopted a "quick taking"
statute for the purpose of expediting highway construction. 46
The public interest was deemed sufficiently important to de-
part from established expropriation practice pursuant to
which a taking was permissible only after final judicial de-
termination of just compensation. 47 Only a timely answer
raising the issue of lack of public purpose, followed by deter-
mination of that issue in the landowner's favor, will defeat
the expropriation. 48 The parties may not litigate the issues of
41. Id. at 8-9.
42. DAIGN & KLEIN at 66.
43. Efurd v. City of Shreveport, 235 La. 555, 105 So. 2d 219 (1958); cf.
Herlitz v. City of Baton Rouge, 298 So. 2d 140 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1974).
44. 298 So. 2d 94 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1974).
45. Id. at 97.
46. LA. R.S. 48:441-60 (1950).
47. DAKIN & KLEIN at 322.
48. Id. at 317.
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necessity and expediency, and filing a valid petition estab-
lishes a prima facie case for public purpose.49 The expro-
priator's advantage in the procedure is evident in such cases
as Southwestern Electric Power Co. v. Conger,50 in which the
issue of public necessity was raised under the general expro-
priation statute and used as a delaying factor, although ulti-
mately it proved unsuccessful. Initial litigation 51 established
the legal authority of the electric generating company to ex-
propriate for a pipeline on the ground that while the statute
speaks only of expropriation for transmission lines and sta-
tions, it also provides for expropriation of all "needed prop-
erty"; the court deemed the right of way for gas pipelines
necessary in order to provide fuel for the plant, which trans-
lated the energy into electricity. 52 However, it required
additional litigation during the past term to establish that,
under the requisite authority, the expropriator had estab-
lished the public necessity for the taking.53
The general expropriation statute also suffers in another
respect when compared by the expropriator with the
quick-taking procedure provided for highway takings. In tak-
ing under the general statute the difference between market
value of property immediately before and after the taking will
determine any severance damages.M Presumably in order to
safeguard the public fisc, in the case of highway takings a
special provision states that severance damages may be de-
termined as of the date of the trial, which may be had within
a year after the completion of the project.55 The Louisiana
Supreme Court noted in State v. Wells5 6 that the special provi-
sion was intended for the purpose of specifying "that the
damages the remainder suffers should be reduced by special
benefits which result to it from the completion of the highway
construction. . . -57 No opportunity to mitigate severance
damages is available under the general statute.58 Louisiana
49. Id. at 369-70.
50. 307 So. 2d 380 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1975).
51. Southwestern Elec. Power Co. v. Conger, 280 So. 2d 254 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1973).
52. Id. at 260-61.
53. Southwestern Elec. Power Co. v. Conger, 307 So. 2d 380, 382 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1975).
54. DAKIN & KLEIN at 75.
55. Id. at 318.
56. 308 So. 2d 774 (La. 1975).
57. Id. at 776.
58. Id.
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follows the rule that special benefits conferred by an expro-
priation of land and improvements are not available as de-
ductions against awards for property taken and that the ben-
efits may only reduce any severance damage award.5 9 In
State v. Stein6" the court notes that the burden of proof to
establish special benefits by a preponderance of the evidence
is on the expropriating authority.6 1 General benefits may not
be deducted at all, the underlying reason being that "a citizen
whose property is taken should not bear more of the cost of
the public improvements than other property owners whose
property is neither taken nor damaged. '62
In expropriation cases tried to a judge sitting without a
jury the accepted practice is for the trial judge to determine
value without being bound by expert opinion expressed by
appraisers.6 3 In Recreation & Park Commission v. Gully &
Associates," a statement by the trial judge in his reasons for
judgment is typical: "We have not attempted to say that the
reasoning of one appraiser is more logical or proper than that
of any other. Frankly we have picked and chosen portions of
the evidence, without regard to appraisal source, in an at-
tempt to reach a decision which we think would reflect the
fair market value of the property at the time of the taking."
In amendments to the quick-taking statute providing for jury
trial the legislature also seems to contemplate considerable
freedom on the part of the jury since, by stipulation, apprais-
al reports or summaries thereof may be taken into the jury
room.6 6 Without stipulation, statements of the relevant value
conclusions admitted as evidence may be taken into the jury
room and the judge "shall not recapitulate or comment upon
the evidence in such manner as to exercise any influence
upon their decision as to the facts. ' '67 One might infer, at least
59. DAKIN & KLEIN at 90-91.
60. 301 So. 2d 384 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974).
61. Id. at 389-90.
62. Tate, Legal Criteria of Damages and Benefits-The Measurement of
Taking-Caused Damages to Untaken Property, 31 LA. L. REV. 431, 437 (1971);
cf. Comment, The Confusing Death of. the Special Benefits Doctrine in
Louisiana Expropriation Law, 34 LA. L. REV. 820, 832 (1974).
63. DAKIN & KLEIN at 401.
64. 303 So. 2d 827 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1975).
65. Id. at 831.
66. LA. R.S. 48:451.18(2) (1950), as amended by La. Acts 1974, Ex. Sess.,
No. 30, § 1.
67. LA. R.S. 48:451.16 (1950), as amended by La. Acts 1974, Ex. Sess., No.
30, § 1.
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in the case where the jury by stipulation has access to ap-
praisal reports, that it would be free to arrive at a verdict by
the same reasoning indicated by the trial court in the Gully
case.
Currently the State Department of Highways usually
takes title to rights of way acquired by expropriation, rather
than merely acquiring servitudes.68 Other expropriators usu-
ally limit the taking to a servitude as a matter of economy
and expedition. 69 The result of the latter practice, however, as
held in Koch v. Louisiana Power & Light Co. 70 is that
additional users of the servitude not included by its terms
must seek the consent of the surface owner for additional use
even though conducting the activity within the confines of
the original servitude. 71 In Koch, the court upheld a manda-
tory injunction precluding additional use until consent was
obtained. 72 In Dickerson v. R.J.M. Pipelines, Inc.,73 the indis-
pensable element for injunctive relief of irreparable injury
was not present although relocation of a pipeline was begun
before title vested in the state, since title vested under the
quick taking statute by the time of the hearing of the matter.
In these circumstances the landowner faced no irreparable
injury since the only possibility of upsetting the taking would
be by showing a lack of public purpose which, if shown, could
be compensated by money damages;7 4 on the other hand, the
court held that the application for injunction was a proper
mode of protecting property rights and the state's demand for
delay damages was rejected.7 5
In State v. Mims, 76 a trial court sought unsuccessfully to
expedite the trial of expropriation cases by requiring plain-
tiffs and defendants to exchange appraisal reports seven days
before trial. Thereafter the reports would be filed as evidence
and the expert allowed limited direct testimony as to ac-
quaintanceship with the property and other pertinent infor-
mation concerning his knowledge of the property; the expert
68. DAKIN & KLEIN at 42.
69. Id. at 34.
70. 298 So. 2d 124 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1974).
71. Id. at 127-28.
72. Id. at 129.
73. 303 So. 2d 262 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1974).
74. Id. at 264.
75. Id. at 265.
76. 311 So. 2d 914 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1975).
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would then be tendered for cross-examination. 77 The court
hoped that this would eliminate extensive direct examination
adducing the contents of written reports. The appellate and
supreme courts denied supervisory writs on the ground that
there was no irreparable injury and no final judgment to
review.7s Thereafter the trial court proceeded in accordance
with the outlined procedure and the state appealed. An appel-
late court reversed on the ground that the procedure ordered
was in violation of the law that precludes ordering "produc-
tion or inspection of any part of the writing that reflects the
mental impressions, conclusions, opinions or theories of an
attorney";7 9 the case was remanded for trial in accordance
with conventional rules for adducing direct testimony.8 0 A
dissenting judge would have approved the procedure; in any
event he would not have remanded but would have reviewed
the case on the record as made."' The majority was impressed
with the fact that the lower court proposed to try all future
expropriation cases in accordance with its rule, deeming the
procedure approved by the denial of supervisory writs. View-
ing the procedure as requiring parties to give up rights as-
sured by the Code of Civil Procedure, the majority remanded
even though appellate review might have successfully cor-
rected errors in the resulting valuation. 82
In a case involving a pipeline taking under the general
expropriation statute, Monterey Pipeline Co. v. DeJean,8 3 the
landowner filed an untimely answer coupled with a reconven-
tional demand; the expropriator urged that the failure to
answer timely was a waiver of all defenses.8 4 The court of
appeal held that the general expropriation statute contained
no prohibition against joining additional actions with expro-
priation and upheld the landowner's claim that prior negotia-
tions had resulted in a valid compromise price substantially
in excess of that offered in the expropriation suit; the argu-
ment that the contract was void for error was rejected by the
court 85
77. Id. at 915.
78. State v. Mims, 283 So. 2d 770 (La. 1973).
79. LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 1452.
80. State v. Mims, 311 So. 2d 914, 918 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1975).
81. Id.
82. Id. at 917-18.
83. 295 So. 2d 466 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1974).
84. Id. at 468.
85. Id. at 468-69.
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The landowner often feels forced to litigate an expropria-
tion in order to obtain what he and his experts conceive to be
the fair market value of the property and adequate severance
damages. If he is right in his position, he is entitled to recover
the fees of experts who supported him in court.8 6 However, as
held in Dixie Electric Membership Corp. v. Guitreau,87 if his
resort to litigation results in no increased recovery he may
find himself a serious loser, since the legislature has provided
"if a tender is made of the true value of the property to the
owner thereof, before proceeding to a forced expropriation,
the cost of the expropriation proceedings shall be paid by the
owner." 88
A change in plans by an expropriating authority may also
work hardship on a landowner. Thus, in Parish of Jefferson v.
Harimaw, Inc.,89 where a change of plans occurred, the ex-
propriator sought dismissal by ex parte motion which was
granted without prejudice after appropriate notice of judg-
ment. The court rejected the argument that such a dismissal
must be with prejudice on the ground that the action would
forever terminate an expropriator's right to later expropria-
tion.90 The court further noted that in the meantime the
landowner could place improvements upon the property and,
if a building permit was not forthcoming, compel it by man-
damus. 91 Since the statute does not provide for appraiser's
fees in abandoned or unsuccessful expropriation suits, the
court refused to award them since they would not have been
"used on the trial" as required by statute.9 2 While attorney's
fees were for many years not included as legal costs, the
legislature has now provided for a reasonable attorney's fee
when expropriation fails or the proceeding is abandoned by
the expropriator. Most recently the legislature has provided
for the award of attorney's fees in successful litigation; the
award may not exceed twenty-five percent of the excess of the
judgment over the amount tendered by the expropriator.9 3
86. DAKIN & KLEIN at 325.
87. 302 So. 2d 324 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1974).
88. LA. R.S. 19:12 (1950).
89. 297 So. 2d 694 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974).
90. Id. at 695.
91. Id. at 696.
92. LA. R.S. 13:4533 (1950).
93. LA. R.S. 48:453E (1950), as amended by La. Acts 1974, Ex. Sess., No.
30, § 1; LA. R.S. 19:8A (1950), as amended by La. Acts 1974, Ex. Sess., No. 11,
§ 1.
